Dr. Mete Şeref Ahunbay

E-Mail

mete.ahunbay@cit.tum.de 

Phone +49 (0) 89 289 17504
Fax +49 (0) 89 289 17535
Office

Boltzmannstraße 3
Room 01.10.057
85748 Garching, Germany

Office Hours By prior arrangement only.

About

I am a postdoctoral researcher at the Technical University of Munich, at the Department of Computer Science within the chair of Decision Sciences & Systems (You should know this already if you are viewing this page!). My research interests are primarily (convex) optimization and its applications, with an emphasis on electricity markets, efficiency of mechanisms, and learning (to bid) in auctions.

I have a multidisciplinary background: I obtained a BSc in Mathematics & Physics (Joint Honours) at McGill University, an MSc in Economics at the London School of Economics, and a PhD in Mathematics at again McGill University - the latter under the supervision of Prof. Adrian Vetta.

You may find my personal webpage here, which also contains my CV.

Page last updated: 10/10/2023.

Publications

Journal Publications

  • The Price of Anarchy of Two-Buyer Sequential Multiunit Auctions [Article]
    Mete Şeref Ahunbay, Adrian Vetta.
    In ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation, accepted 27th February 2023.

Conference Papers

  • Pricing Optimal Outcomes in Coupled and Non-Convex Markets: Theory and Applications to Electricity Markets [arXiv] [ACM]
    Mete Şeref Ahunbay, Martin Bichler, Johannes Knörr
    In Proceedings of the 24th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC'23).
  • Two-Buyer Sequential Multiunit Auctions with No Overbidding [arXiv] [Springer]
    Mete Şeref Ahunbay, Brendan Lucier, Adrian Vetta
    In Proceedings of the 13th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT'20).
  • The Price of Anarchy of Two-Buyer Sequential Multiunit Auctions [arXiv] [Springer]
    Mete Şeref Ahunbay, Adrian Vetta
    In Proceedings of the 16th Conference on Web and Internet Economics (WINE'20).
  • The Price of Stability of Envy-Free Equilibria in Multi-Buyer Sequential Auctions [Springer]
    Mete Şeref Ahunbay, Brendan Lucier, Adrian Vetta
    In Proceedings of the 14th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT'21).
  • Improved Two Sample Revenue Guarantees via Mixed-Integer Linear Programming [MATLAB/Mathematica Code] [arXiv] [Springer]
    Mete Şeref Ahunbay, Adrian Vetta
    In Proceedings of the 14th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT'21).

In Preparation

  • Solving Large-Scale Electricity Market Pricing Problems in Polynomial Time
    Mete Şeref Ahunbay, Martin Bichler, Teodora Doboş, Johanner Knörr
    Concerned with applying the approximation mechanism of (Milgrom & Watt, 2023) to realistic size nodal electricity markets.
  • On the Convergence of No-Regret Learners to Approximate Bayes-Nash Equilibrium in Single Item Auctions
    Mete Şeref Ahunbay, Martin Bichler
    In which we inspect informational assumptions which ensure that Bayesian Coarse Correlated Equilibria of (continuous or discretised) single item auctions are close to their unique equilibrium.

Teaching

Winter 2021/2022 Teaching Assistant

Auction Theory and Market Design 

Winter 2022/2023 Lecturer Auction Theory and Market Design