Auction Theory and Market Design (IN2211)

Mete Ahunbay PhD

Eleni Batziou M.Sc. · Dmitrij Boschko M.Sc. · Laura Mathews M.Sc. · Matthias Oberlechner M.Sc. · Fabian Pieroth M.Sc.

Intended learning outcomes

The field of market design studies how to construct rules for allocating resources or to structure successful marketplaces. It draws on the tools of game theory and mechanism design to identify why certain market rules or institutions succeed and why others fail. The field has become popular in the recent years with many applications in the sale of spectrum licenses, electricity markets, or the assignment of students to courses. 

After participating in the course, the participants understand methods and game-theoretical models of auctions as well as the fundamental problems in the design of combinatorial auctions. They are able to assess the properties of different auction formats, and the results of theoretical and experimental analyses.

Prerequisites

Students should be familiar with linear and integer optimization. The lecture on algorithmic game theory provides complementary concepts in game theory. The course is not solely applied, and students are expected to be able to write mathematical proofs. A rudimentary understanding of probability, calculus and linear algebra (especially as it pertains to linear programming) is also expected. While the course touches upon issues on complexity, such discussions are self-contained and a background in algorithms and complexity is not required.

Syllabus

• Lectures and tutorial classes will be given on-site, but streamed via TUM-Live such that students can access from remote.

• Lectures: Wednesdays, 14:00 - 16:30, TUM Department of Informatics, Garching-Forschungszentrum, MI Hörsaal 2 (00.04.011).

• Tutorial: Thursday, 16:15 - 18:00 TUM Department of Informatics, Garching-Forschungszentrum, MI Hörsaal 2 (00.04.011)

• Final examination: February 3rd, 2023

Organization

• Slides: will be made available before each class in the eLearning plattform Moodle.

• Registration for the lecture and exercise opens on September 26th.

• You have to be registered for the lecture to get access to the Moodle course.

Literature

• Lecture notes via Moodle.

• M. Bichler: Market Design - A Linear Programming Approach to Auctions and Matching. Cambridge University Press. Available online via the TUM library.

• Y. Shoham and K. Leyton-Brown: Multiagent Systems: Algorithmic, Game-Theoretic, and Logical Foundations. Available as PDF at: http://www.masfoundations.org/mas.pdf (Chapters 3, 5, 6, 10, 11, 12)

• N. Nisan, T. Roughgarden, E. Tardos and V. Vazirani (editors): Algorithmic Game Theory. Available as PDF at: https://www.cs.cmu.edu/~sandholm/cs15-892F13/algorithmic-game-theory.pdf(Chapters 9 and 11 by Nisan)

• V. Krishna: Auction Theory