Dr. René Romen
E-Mail: romen@cit.tum.de
Phone: +49 (0) 89 289 - 17514
Fax: +49 (0) 89 289 - 17535
Office: Room 01.10.039
Boltzmannstr. 3
85748 Munich, Germany
Hours: by arrangement
Short Bio
I am a PhD student in the group of Prof. Brandt since February 2021. I studied Informatics at TUM from 2015 to 2020. Furthermore, I am interested in different topics in computational social choice, but focus on probabilistic social choice. I mainly work with computer aided methods, such as SAT-solving, SMT-solving, linear programming and integer programming. Additionally, I am interested in online coalition formation.
Publications
M. Bullinger, R. Romen, and A. Schlenga.
The power of matching for online fractional hedonic games.
In Proceedings of the 37th Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete
Algorithms (SODA), 2026.
Forthcoming.
[ pdf ]
F. Brandt, M. Greger, and R. Romen.
On strategyproofness and localizedness in social choice.
2025.
Working paper.
[ pdf ]
M. Bullinger and R. Romen.
Online coalition formation under random arrival or coalition
dissolution.
ACM Transactions on Algorithms, 22(1):4:1–43, 2025.
M. Bullinger and R. Romen.
Stability in online coalition formation.
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research, 82:2423–2452,
2025.
M. Bullinger, R. Romen, and A. Schlenga.
The power of matching for online fractional hedonic games.
In Proceedings of the 10th International Workshop on
Computational Social Choice (COMSOC), 2025.
[ link |
pdf ]
R. Romen.
Performance guarantees in probabilistic social choice and online
coalition formation.
PhD thesis, Technische Universität München, 2025.
M. Bullinger and R. Romen.
Stability in online coalition formation.
In Proceedings of the 38th AAAI Conference on Artificial
Intelligence (AAAI), pages 9537–9545, 2024.
[ pdf |
venue ]
F. Brandt, P. Lederer, and R. Romen.
Relaxed notions of Condorcet-consistency and efficiency for
strategyproof social decision schemes.
Social Choice and Welfare, 63(1):19–55, 2024.
[ link |
pdf ]
M. Bullinger and R. Romen.
Online coalition formation under random arrival or coalition
dissolution.
In Proceedings of the 31st European Symposium on Algorithms
(ESA), pages 27:1–27:18, 2023.
[ pdf |
venue ]
F. Brandt, P. Lederer, and R. Romen.
Relaxed notions of Condorcet-consistency and efficiency for
strategyproof social decision schemes.
In Proceedings of the 21st International Conference on
Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS), pages 181–189, 2022.
[ link |
pdf |
venue ]
R. Romen.
Non-manipulable social decision schemes.
Master's thesis, Technical University of Munich, 2020.
Teaching
Courses
- Economics and Computation (SS 2024)
- Computational Social Choice (WS 2023/24)
- Economics and Computation (SS 2023)
- Computational Social Choice (WS 2022/23)
- Economics and Computation (SS 2022)
- Computational Social Choice (WS 2021/22)
- Economics and Computation (SS 2021)
Student Project supervision
- Bachelor's thesis Finding minimal voting paradoxes for Dodgson's rule by Felix Heinermann
- Master's thesis Locally Pareto Optimal Coalition Formation by David Gamsiz
- IDP Minimal Voting Paradoxes for Approval-Based Committe Elections by Tabea Frisch
- Master's thesis Weighted Topological Distance Games by Ismet Ćosić
- IDP Deterministic Extreme Point Property in Social Choice by Zsofia Biegl
Projects
I maintain and continue to develop the following Projects:
- Voting.ml : A website that computes Maximal Lotteries and many other social choice functions. You can find extra functionality at pro.voting.ml.
- Pnyx: A powerful and user friendly preference aggregation tool.
You can send feedback, questions, and request about these projects to me.
