Patrick Lederer

E-Mail: ledererp@in.tum.de
Phone: +49 (0) 89 289 - 17537
Fax: +49 (0) 89 289 - 17535

Office: Room 01.10.040
Boltzmannstr. 3
85748 Munich, Germany

Hours: by arrangement


Short Bio

I am a PhD student in the group of Prof. Brandt since February 2020. Before that, I studied Informatics at TUM, where I received my Bachelor's degree in 2018 and my Master's degree in 2020. My research focuses on axiomatic aspects of collective decision making, in particular on how to avoid manipulability in elections. 

I graduated in March 2024, and moved to UNSW Sydney to work as a postdoctoral fellow with Haris Aziz. You find my new webpage here

Working Papers

P. Lederer, D. Peters, and T. Was. The squared Kemeny rule for averaging rankings. 2023. Working paper. [ pdf ]

F. Frank and P. Lederer. The metric distortion of randomized social choice functions: C1 maximal lottery rules and simulations. 2023. Working paper. [ pdf ]

P. Lederer. Bivariate scoring rules: Unifying the characterizations of positional scoring rules and Kemeny's rule. 2023. Working paper. [ pdf ]

Journal Papers

F. Brandt, P. Lederer, and R. Romen. Relaxed notions of Condorcet-consistency and efficiency for strategyproof social decision schemes. Social Choice and Welfare, 2024. Forthcoming. [ link | pdf ]

F. Brandt, P. Lederer, and W. Suksompong. Incentives in social decision schemes with pairwise comparison preferences. Games and Economic Behavior, 142:266–291, 2023. [ link | pdf ]

F. Brandt and P. Lederer. Characterizing the top cycle via strategyproofness. Theoretical Economics, 18(2):837–883, 2023. [ link | pdf ]

F. Brandt, M. Bullinger, and P. Lederer. On the indecisiveness of Kelly-strategyproof social choice functions. Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research, 73:1093–1130, 2022. [ link | pdf ]

Conference Papers

P. Lederer. Strategic manipulation in social choice theory. PhD thesis, Technische Universität München, 2024. [ link | pdf ]

M. Bullinger, C. Dong, P. Lederer, and C. Mehler. Participation incentives in approval-based committee elections. In Proceedings of the 38th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI), 2024. Forthcoming. [ pdf ]

C. Dong and P. Lederer. Refined characterizations of approval-based committee scoring rules. In Proceedings of the 38th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI), 2024. Forthcoming. [ pdf ]

C. Dong and P. Lederer. Characterizations of sequential valuation rules. In Proceedings of the 22nd International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS), pages 1697–1705, 2023. [ link | pdf | venue ]

T. Delemazure, T. Demeulemeester, M. Eberl, J. Israel, and P. Lederer. Strategyproofness and proportionality in party-approval multiwinner elections. In Proceedings of the 37th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI), pages 5591–5599, 2023. [ pdf | venue ]

F. Brandt, P. Lederer, and S. Tausch. Strategyproof social decision schemes on super Condorcet domains. In Proceedings of the 22nd International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS), pages 1734–1742, 2023. [ link | pdf | venue ]

T. Delemazure, T. Demeulemeester, M. Eberl, J. Israel, and P. Lederer. The incompatibility of strategy-proofness and representation in party-approval multi-winner elections. Archive of Formal Proofs, 2022. [ .html ]

F. Brandt, P. Lederer, and W. Suksompong. Incentives in social decision schemes with pairwise comparison preferences. In Proceedings of the 31st International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI), pages 130–136, 2022. [ link | pdf | venue ]

F. Brandt, P. Lederer, and R. Romen. Relaxed notions of Condorcet-consistency and efficiency for strategyproof social decision schemes. In Proceedings of the 21st International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS), pages 181–189, 2022. [ link | pdf | venue ]

P. Lederer. Strategyproof randomized social choice for restricted sets of utility functions. In Proceedings of the 30th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI), pages 306–312, 2021. [ link | pdf | venue ]

P. Lederer. Non-manipulability in set-valued and probabilistic social choice theory (doctoral consortium). In Proceedings of the 20th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS), pages 1823–1825, 2021. [ link | pdf | venue ]

F. Brandt, M. Bullinger, and P. Lederer. On the indecisiveness of Kelly-strategyproof social choice functions. In Proceedings of the 20th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS), pages 251–259, 2021. [ link | pdf | venue ]

Teaching

Courses

Student Projects

  • Master's thesis  ɛ-​Strategyproofness Social Decision Schemes (Jonathan Stein, 2024)
  • Master's thesis  Strategyproofness in Approval-based Committee Elections: Domain Restrictions and Iterative Voting (Evghenii Beriozchin, 2024)
  • Interdisciplinary Project  A Quantitative Analysis of Set Extensions for Social Choice Theory (Ahmet Semiz, 2023)
  • Master's thesis  Metric Distortion in Randomized Social Choice (Fabian Frank, 2023)
  • Bachelor's thesis  Modeling Utility Functions in Social Choice Theory (Michelle Heinz, 2022)
  • Bachelor's thesis  Random Assignment with Pairwise Comparison Preferences (Patryk Morawski, 2022)
  • Master's thesis  Understanding the SD impossibiliy theorem (Alexander Thole, 2021)
  • Master's thesis  Characterizing the Condorcet Rule (Sascha Tausch, 2021)
  • Master's thesis  Non-manipulable Social Desicision Schemes (Rene Romen, 2020)

 

Community Service

Refereeing Conferences and Workshops

Refereeing Journals

  • Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research (JAIR)
  • Theoretical Economics (TE) [as subreviewer]
  • Games and Economic Behavior (GEB)
  • Social Choice and Welfare (SCW)
  • Journal of Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems (JAAMAS)
  • AMS Contemporary Mathematics Series (CMS)
  • Mathematical Social Sciences (MSS)
  • Theory of Computing Systems (TOCS)
  • Artificial Intelligence (AIJ)