In this note we prove that the class of valuation functions representable via integer assignment messages is a proper subset of strong substitutes valuations. Thus, there are strong substitutes valuations not expressible via assignment messages.M. Bichler, M. Fichtl, S. Heidekrüger, N. Kohring, and P. Sutterer. Learning equilibria in symmetric auction games using artificial neural networks. Nature Machine Intelligence, 3:687–695, August 2021. [ DOI | link | pdf | http ] A. Ashour Novirdoust, M. Bichler, C. Bojung, H. U. Buhl, G. Fridgen, V. Gretschko, L. Hanny, J. Knörr, F. Maldonado, K. Neuhoff, C. Neumann, M. Ott, J. C. Richstein, M. Rinck, M. Schöpf, P. Schott, A. Sitzmann, J. Wagner, J. Wagner, and M. Weibelzahl. Electricity spot market design 2030-2050. 2021. [ DOI ] A. Ashour Novirdoust, R. Bhuiyan, M. Bichler, H. U. Buhl, G. Fridgen, C. Fugger, V. Gretschko, L. Hanny, J. Knörr, K. Neuhoff, C. Neumann, M. Ott, J. C. Richstein, M. Rinck, F. Röhrich, M. Schöpf, A. Sitzmann, J. Wagner, and M. Weibelzahl. Electricity market design 2030-2050: Moving towards implementation. 2021. [ DOI ] M. Bichler and S. Merting. Randomized scheduling mechanisms: Assigning course seats in a fair and efficient way. Production and Operations Management, 30(10):3540–3559, October 2021. [ DOI | link | pdf ] M. Bichler and S. Waldherr. Core-pricing in combinatorial exchanges with financially constrained buyers: Computational hardness and algorithmic solutions. Operations Research, 70(1):241–264, November 2021. [ DOI | pdf ] M. Bichler, R. Littmann, and S. Waldherr. Trading airport time slots: Market design with complex constraints. Transportation Research Part B: Methodological, 145:118–133, March 2021. [ DOI | pdf ] M. Bullinger, W. Suksompong, and A. Voudouris. Welfare guarantees in Schelling segregation. Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research, 71:143–174, 2021. [ link | pdf ] M. Bichler. Der Nobelpreis für Wirtschaftswissenschaften 2020 und seine Bezüge zum Operations Research. OR News, 69(3), 2020. [ link | pdf ] M. Bichler. Comments on: Shared resources in collaborative vehicle routing. TOP, 28:21–24, April 2020. [ DOI ] M. Bichler, M. Fichtl, and G. Schwarz. Walrasian equilibria from an optimization perspective: A guide to the literature. Naval Research Logistics, 68(4):496–513, 2020. [ DOI ] M. Bichler, V. Grimm, S. Kretschmer, and P. Sutterer. Market design for renewable energy auctions: An analysis of alternative auction formats. Energy Economics, 92:104904, October 2020. [ DOI ] M. Bichler, Z. Hao, R. Littmann, and S. Waldherr. Strategyproof auction mechanisms for network procurement. OR Spectrum, 42(3):965–994, 2020. [ DOI | pdf ] M. Bichler, T. Morrill, and S. Waldherr. How to assign scarce resources without money: Designing information systems that are efficient, truthful, and (pretty) fair. INFORMS Information Systems Research, 32(2):335–355, 2020. [ DOI | link | pdf ] P. Karaenke, M. Bichler, S. Merting, and S. Minner. Non-monetary coordination mechanisms for time slot allocation in warehouse delivery. European Journal of Operational Research, 286(3):897–907, 2020. [ DOI | pdf | http ] P. Paulsen, M. Bichler, and G. Kokott. The beauty of Dutch: Bidding behavior in combinatorial first-price procurement auctions. European Journal of Operational Research, 291(2):711–721, 2020. [ DOI ] T. Widmer, P. Karaenke, and V. Sugumaran. Two‐sided service markets: Effects of quality differentiation on market efficiency. Managerial and Decision Economics, 2020. [ DOI | pdf | http ] C. Saile and W. Suksompong. Robust bounds on choosing from large tournaments. Social Choice and Welfare, 54(1):87–100, 2020. F. Brandl and F. Brandt. Arrovian aggregation of convex preferences. Econometrica, 88(2):799–844, 2020. [ link | pdf ] M. Bichler, V. Fux, and J. Goeree. Designing environmental markets for trading catch shares. INFORMS Journal on Applied Analytics, 49(5):324–337, 2019. [ DOI ] M. Bichler and S. Waldherr. Competitive equilibria in combinatorial exchanges with financially constrained buyers: Computational hardness and algorithmic solutions. ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 20, 2019. [ pdf ] P. Karaenke, M. Bichler, and S. Minner. Coordination is hard: Electronic auction mechanisms for increased efficiency in transportation logistics. Management Science, 65(12):5449–5956, 2019. [ DOI | link | pdf ] G. Kokott, M. Bichler, and P. Paulsen. The beauty of Dutch: Ex-post split-award auctions in procurement markets with diseconomies of scale. European Journal on Operational Research, 278(1):202–210, 2019. [ DOI | pdf ] G. Kokott, M. Bichler, and P. Paulsen. First-price split-award auctions in procurement markets with economies of scale. Production and Operations Management, 28(3):721–739, March 2019. [ DOI | link | pdf ] P. Sutterer, S. Waldherr, and M. Bichler. Are truthful bidders paying too much? Efficiency and revenue in display ad auctions. ACM Transactions on Management Information Systems, 10(2):1–18, 2019. [ DOI ] G. Bachmeier, F. Brandt, C. Geist, P. Harrenstein, K. Kardel, D. Peters, and H. G. Seedig. k-majority digraphs and the hardness of voting with a constant number of voters. Journal of Computer and System Sciences, 105:130–157, 2019. [ link | pdf ] F. Brandl, F. Brandt, C. Geist, and J. Hofbauer. Strategic abstention based on preference extensions: Positive results and computer-generated impossibilities. Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research, 66:1031–1056, 2019. [ link | pdf ] F. Brandl and F. Brandt. Justifying optimal play via consistency. Theoretical Economics, 14(4):1185–1201, 2019. [ link | pdf ] H. Aziz, F. Brandl, F. Brandt, P. Harrenstein, M. Olsen, and D. Peters. Fractional hedonic games. ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation, 7(2):1–29, 2019. [ link | pdf ] F. Brandl and D. Peters. An axiomatic characterization of the Borda mean rule. Social Choice and Welfare, 52(4):685–707, 2019. [ link | pdf ] F. Brandl, F. Brandt, and J. Hofbauer. Welfare maximization entices participation. Games and Economic Behavior, 14:308–314, 2019. [ link | pdf ] W. van der Aalst, M. Bichler, and A. Heinzl. Robotic process automation. Business & Information Systems Engineering, 60(4):269–272, 2018. [ DOI ] M. Bichler. Views on the past, present, and future of business and information systems engineering. Business & Information Systems Engineering, 60(6):443–477, 2018. [ DOI | pdf ] M. Bichler, S. Fadaei, and D. Kraft. A simple and fast algorithm for convex decomposition in relax-and-round mechanisms. Computers and Operations Research, 103:277–287, 2018. [ DOI | pdf ] M. Bichler, V. Fux, and J. Goeree. A matter of equality: Linear pricing in combinatorial exchanges. INFORMS Information Systems Research, 29(4):1024–1043, 2018. [ DOI | link | pdf ] M. Bichler, V. Fux, and J. Goeree. Designing combinatorial exchanges for the reallocation of resource rights. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences (PNAS), 116(3):786–791, 2018. [ DOI | link ] M. Bichler and S. Merting. Truthfulness in advertising? approximation mechanisms for knapsack bidders. European Journal of Operational Research, 270(2):775–783, 2018. [ DOI | link ] M. Bichler, S. Merting, and A. Uzunoglu. Assigning course schedules: About preference elicitation, fairness, and truthfulness. CoRR, abs/1812.02630, 2018. [ arXiv | link ] M. Bichler and P. Paulsen. A principal-agent model of bidding firms in multi-unit auctions. Games and Economic Behavior, 111:20–40, September 2018. [ DOI | link | pdf ] M. Bultmann, S. Knust, and S. Waldherr. Flow shop scheduling with fexible processing times. OR Spektrum, 40:809–829, 2018. [ DOI ] M. Bultmann, S. Knust, and S. Waldherr. Synchronous fow shop scheduling with pliable jobs. European Journal of Operational Research, 270:943–956, 2018. [ DOI ] A. Goetzendorff, M. Bichler, and J. K. Goeree. Synergistic valuations and efficiency in spectrum auctions. Telecommunications Policy, 42(1):91–105, 2018. [ DOI | pdf | http ] A. Heinzl, W. van der Aalst, and M. Bichler. Why the community should care about technology-centric journal rankings. Business & Information Systems Engineering, 60(2):91–93, 2018. [ DOI ] F. Brandt, M. Brill, H. G. Seedig, and W. Suksompong. On the structure of stable tournament solutions. Economic Theory, 65(2):483–507, 2018. [ link | pdf ] F. Brandl and T. Kavitha. Two problems in max-size popular matchings. Algorithmica, 81(7):2738–2764, 2018. [ link ] F. Brandl, F. Brandt, M. Eberl, and C. Geist. Proving the incompatibility of efficiency and strategyproofness via SMT solving. Journal of the ACM, 65(2):1–28, 2018. [ link | pdf ] F. Brandt, M. Brill, and P. Harrenstein. Extending tournament solutions. Social Choice and Welfare, 51(2):193–222, 2018. [ link | pdf ] H. Aziz, F. Brandl, F. Brandt, and M. Brill. On the tradeoff between efficiency and strategyproofness. Games and Economic Behavior, 110:1–18, 2018. [ link | pdf ] W. van der Aalst, M. Bichler, and A. Heinzl. Responsible data science. Business and Information Systems Engineering, 59(5), 2017. S. Albers, M. Bichler, F. Brandt, P. Gritzmann, and R. Kolisch. Algorithmic economics und operations research. Informatik Spektrum, 40(2):165–171, 2017. [ link | pdf ] M. Bichler and J. K. Goeree. Frontiers in spectrum auction design. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 50:372–391, 2017. [ DOI | link ] M. Bichler, V. Gretschko, and M. Janssen. Bargaining in spectrum auctions: a review of the german auction in 2015. Telecommunications Policy, 41(5-6):325–340, 2017. [ DOI | link | pdf ] M. Bichler, Z. Hao, and G. Adomavicius. Coalition-based pricing in ascending combinatorial auctions. Information Systems Research, 28(1):159–179, 2017. [ link | pdf ] M. Bichler, A. Heinzl, and W. van der Aalst. Business analytics and data science: Once again? Business and Information Systems Engineering, 58(2), 2017. M. Bichler and S. Waldherr. Core and pricing equilibria in combinatorial exchanges. Economics Letters, 157:145 – 147, 2017. [ DOI | http ] F. Diebold and M. Bichler. Matching with indifferences: A comparison of algorithms in the context of course allocation. European Journal of Operational Research, 260(1):268–282, 2017. [ link | pdf ] S. Fadaei and M. Bichler. Generalized assignment problem: Truthful mechanism design without money. Operations Research Letters, 45(1):72–76, 2017. [ pdf ] S. Fadaei and M. Bichler. Truthfulness with value-maximizing bidders: On the limits of approximation in combinatorial markets. European Journal of Operational Research, 260(2):767–777, 2017. [ link | pdf ] S. Fadaei and M. Bichler. A truthful mechanism for the generalized assignment problem. ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation (TEAC), 5(3):14, 2017. [ DOI | link | pdf ] A. Heinzl, M. Bichler, and W. van der Aalst. Trans-national joint research projects - defying the odds of national inter-university competition. Business and Information Systems Engineering, 59(4), 2017. A. Heinzl, M. Bichler, and W. van der Aalst. Trans-national joint research projects. Business & Information Systems Engineering, 59(4), 2017. M. Strehler, S. Merting, and C. Schwan. Energy-efficient shortest routes for electric and hybrid vehicles. Transportation Research Part B: Methodological, 103(Supplement C):111 – 135, 2017. Green Urban Transportation. [ DOI | http ] S. Waldherr and S. Knust. Decomposition algorithms for synchronous flow shop problems with additional resources and setup times. European Journal of Operational Research, 259(3):847–863, 2017. S. Waldherr, S. Knust, and D. Briskorn. Synchronous flow shop problems: How much can we gain by leaving machines idle? Omega, 72:15–24, 2017. S. Albers, M. Bichler, F. Brandt, P. Gritzmann, and R. Kolisch. Algorithmic Economics und Operations Research. Informatik Spektrum, 40(2):165–171, 2017. Special Issue “50 Jahre Informatik München”. [ link | pdf ] F. Brandt, C. Geist, and D. Peters. Optimal bounds for the no-show paradox via SAT solving. Mathematical Social Sciences, 90:18–27, 2017. Special Issue in Honor of Hervé Moulin. [ link | pdf ] F. Brandl. The distribution of optimal strategies in symmetric zero-sum games. Games and Economic Behavior, 104:674–680, 2017. [ link | pdf ] F. Brandt, P. Harrenstein, and H. G. Seedig. Minimal extending sets in tournaments. Mathematical Social Sciences, 87:55–63, 2017. [ link | pdf ] W. van der Aalst, M. Bichler, and A. Heinzl. Open research in business and information systems engineering. Business and Information Systems Engineering, 57(6), 2016. M. Bichler, A. Heinzl, and W. van der Aalst. Bise and the engineering sciences. Business & Information Systems Engineering, 58(2), 2016. K. Guler, M. Bichler, and J. Petrakis. Ascending combinatorial auctions with risk averse bidders. INFORMS Group Decision and Negotiation, 25(3):609–639, May 2016. [ link | pdf ] A. Heinzl, M. Bichler, and W. van der Aalst. Disciplinary pluralism, flagship conferences, and journal submissions. Business and Information Systems Engineering, 58(4), 2016. C. Kroemer, M. Bichler, and A. Goetzendorff. (Un)expected bidder behavior in spectrum auctions. INFORMS Group Decision and Negotiation, 25(1):31–63, 2016. [ link | pdf ] A. Woke, M. Bichler, F. Chirigati, and V. Steeves. Reproducible experiments on dynamic resource allocation in cloud data centers. Information Systems, 59:98–101, 2016. [ DOI | link | pdf ] A. Wolke, M. Bichler, and T. Setzer. Planning vs. dynamic control: Resource allocation in corporate clouds. IEEE Transactions on Cloud Computing, 4(3):322–335, 2016. [ link | pdf ] F. Brandl, F. Brandt, and W. Suksompong. The impossibility of extending random dictatorship to weak preferences. Economics Letters, 141:44–47, 2016. [ link | pdf ] J. Hofbauer. d-dimensional stable matching with cyclic preferences. Mathematical Social Sciences, 82:72–76, 2016. [ link | pdf ] F. Brandl, F. Brandt, and H. G. Seedig. Consistent probabilistic social choice. Econometrica, 84(5):1839–1880, 2016. [ link | pdf ] F. Brandt, M. Brill, and W. Suksompong. An ordinal minimax theorem. Games and Economic Behavior, 95:107–112, 2016. [ link | pdf ] F. Brandt and C. Geist. Finding strategyproof social choice functions via SAT solving. Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research, 55:565–602, 2016. [ link | pdf ] F. Brandt and M. Brill. Computing dominance-based solution concepts. ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation, 5(2):1–22, 2016. [ link | pdf ] F. Brandt, C. Geist, and P. Harrenstein. A note on the McKelvey uncovered set and Pareto optimality. Social Choice and Welfare, 46(1):81–91, 2016. [ link | pdf ] M. Bichler, K. Guler, and S. Mayer. Split-award procurement auctions: Can Bayesian equilibrium strategies predict human bidding behavior in multi-object auctions? Production and Operations Management, 24(6):1012–1027, June 2015. [ link | pdf ] M. Bichler, A. Heinzl, and R. Winter. Practice impact of IS research. Business and Information Systems Engineering, 57(2), 2015. A. Goetzendorff, M. Bichler, B. Day, and P. Shabalin. Compact bid languages and core-pricing in large multi-object auctions. Management Science, 61(7):1684 – 1703, 2015. [ DOI | link | pdf ] A. Heinzl, R. Winter, and M. Bichler. Internationalization of information systems research and teaching. Business and Information Systems Engineering, 57(4), 2015. R. Winter, M. Bichler, and A. Heinzl. Teaching: The little brother of research. Business and Information Systems Engineering, 57(6), 2015. A. Woke, B. Tsend-Ayush, C. Pfeiffer, and M. Bichler. More than bin packing: On dynamic resource allocation strategies in cloud computing. Information Systems, 51(C):83–95, 2015. [ link | pdf ] F. Brandt, M. Brill, E. Hemaspaandra, and L. A. Hemaspaandra. Bypassing combinatorial protections: Polynomial-time algorithms for single-peaked electorates. Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research, 53:439–496, 2015. [ link | pdf ] H. Aziz, F. Brandl, and F. Brandt. Universal Pareto dominance and welfare for plausible utility functions. Journal of Mathematical Economics, 60:123–133, 2015. [ link | pdf ] F. Brandt, A. Dau, and H. G. Seedig. Bounds on the disparity and separation of tournament solutions. Discrete Applied Mathematics, 187:41–49, 2015. [ link | pdf ] F. Brandt. Set-monotonicity implies Kelly-strategyproofness. Social Choice and Welfare, 45(4):793–804, 2015. [ link | pdf ] M. Bichler. Reflections on design science research in information systems. Business and Information Systems Engineering, 56(1):3, 2014. M. Bichler, J. Goeree, S. Mayer, and P. Shabalin. Spectrum auction design: Simple auctions for complex sales. Telecommunications Policy, 38:613–622, 2014. [ link | pdf ] M. Bichler, T. Hass, P. Loos, and R. Krishnan. Research areas in business and information systems engineering. Business and Information Systems Engineering, 56(1):2, 2014. F. Diebold, H. Aziz, M. Bichler, F. Matthes, and A. Schneider. Course allocation via stable matching. Business and Information Systems Engineering, 56(2):111–125, 2014. [ link | pdf ] H. Aziz, F. Brandt, M. Brill, and J. Mestre. Computational aspects of random serial dictatorship. ACM SIGecom Exchanges, 13(2):26–30, 2014. [ link | pdf ] F. Brandt, M. Brill, F. Fischer, and P. Harrenstein. Minimal retentive sets in tournaments. Social Choice and Welfare, 42(3):551–574, 2014. [ link | pdf ] M. Bichler, P. Shabalin, and J. Wolf. Do core-selecting combinatorial clock auctions always lead to high efficiency? An experimental analysis of spectrum auction designs. Experimental Economics, 16(4):511–545, 2013. [ link | pdf ] M. Bichler, P. Shabalin, and G. Ziegler. Efficiency with linear prices? A theoretical and experimental analysis of the combinatorial clock auction. INFORMS Information Systems Research, 24(2):394–417, 2013. [ link | pdf ] C. Hass, M. Bichler, and K. Guler. Optimization-based decision support for scenario analysis in sourcing markets with economies of scale and scope. Electronic Commerce Research and Applications, 12(3):152–165, 2013. [ link ] I. Petrakis, G. Ziegler, and M. Bichler. Ascending combinatorial auctions with allocation constraints: Game-theoretical and computational properties of generic pricing rules. INFORMS Information Systems Research, 24(3):768–786, 2013. [ link | pdf ] H. Aziz, F. Brandt, and H. G. Seedig. Computing desirable partitions in additively separable hedonic games. Artificial Intelligence, 195:316–334, 2013. [ link | pdf ] H. Aziz, F. Brandt, and P. Harrenstein. Pareto optimality in coalition formation. Games and Economic Behavior, 82:562–581, 2013. [ link | pdf ] F. Brandt, F. Fischer, and P. Harrenstein. On the rate of convergence of fictitious play. Theory of Computing Systems, 53(1):41–52, 2013. Special Issue on Algorithmic Game Theory. [ link | pdf ] D. Baumeister, F. Brandt, F. Fischer, J. Hoffmann, and J. Rothe. The complexity of computing minimal unidirectional covering sets. Theory of Computing Systems, 53(3):467–502, 2013. [ link | pdf ] H. Aziz, F. Brandt, and M. Brill. The computational complexity of random serial dictatorship. Economics Letters, 121(3):341–345, 2013. [ link | pdf ] F. Brandt, M. Chudnovsky, I. Kim, G. Liu, S. Norin, A. Scott, P. Seymour, and S. Thomassé. A counterexample to a conjecture of Schwartz. Social Choice and Welfare, 40(3):739–743, 2013. [ link | pdf ] I. Petrakis, C. Hass, and M. Bichler. On the impact of real-time information on field service scheduling. Decision Support Systems, 53(2):282–293, 2012. [ link | pdf ] T. Scheffel, G. Ziegler, and M. Bichler. On the impact of package selection in combinatorial auctions: An experimental study in the context of spectrum auction design. Experimental Economics, 15(4):667–692, 2012. [ link | pdf ] T. Setzer and M. Bichler. Using matrix approximation for high-dimensional server allocation problems. European Journal on Operational Research, 227(1):62–75, 2012. [ link | pdf ] M. Bichler and K. Battacharya. It-service-management und it-automation: Methoden und modelle für effizienten it-betrieb (editorial). Business and Information Systems Engineering, 53(1):2, 2011. M. Bichler, A. Gupta, and W. Ketter. Designing smart markets. INFORMS Information Systems Research, 21(4):688–699, 2011. [ link ] M. Bichler, S. Schneider, K. Guler, and M. Sayal. Compact bidding languages and supplier selection for markets with economies of scale and scope. European Journal on Operational Research, 214(1):67–77, 2011. [ link | pdf ] T. Dierkes, M. Bichler, and R. Krishnan. Estimating the effect of word of mouth on churn and cross-buying in the mobile phone market with markov logic networks. Decision Support Systems, 51(3):361–371, 2011. [ link | pdf ] T. Scheffel, A. Pikovsky, M. Bichler, and K. Guler. An experimental comparison of linear and non-linear price combinatorial auctions. INFORMS Information Systems Research, 22(2):346–368, 2011. [ link | pdf ] H. Aziz, Y. Bachrach, E. Elkind, and M. Paterson. False-name manipulations in weighted voting games. Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research, 40(57–93), 2011. F. Brandt, M. Brill, F. Fischer, and P. Harrenstein. On the complexity of iterated weak dominance in constant-sum games. Theory of Computing Systems, 49(1):162–181, 2011. Special Issue on Algorithmic Game Theory. [ link | pdf ] F. Brandt, M. Brill, F. Fischer, and J. Hoffmann. The computational complexity of weak saddles. Theory of Computing Systems, 49(1):139–161, 2011. Special Issue on Algorithmic Game Theory. [ link | pdf ] F. Brandt, F. Fischer, and M. Holzer. Equilibria of graphical games with symmetries. Theoretical Computer Science, 412:675–685, 2011. [ link | pdf ] F. Brandt. Minimal stable sets in tournaments. Journal of Economic Theory, 146(4):1481–1499, 2011. [ link | pdf ] F. Brandt and P. Harrenstein. Set-rationalizable choice and self-stability. Journal of Economic Theory, 146(4):1721–1731, 2011. [ link | pdf ] O. Hühn, C. Markl, and M. Bichler. On the predictive performance of queueing network models for large-scale distributed transaction processing systems. Information Technology & Management, 2-3:135–149, 2010. [ link | pdf ] C. Markl, O. Hühn, and M. Bichler. Short-term performance management by priority-based queueing. Service Oriented Computing and Applications, Springer Verlag, 3(1):169–180, 2010. [ link | pdf ] S. Schneider, P. Shabalin, and M. Bichler. On the robustness of non-linear personalized price combinatorial auctions. European Journal on Operational Research, 206(1):248–259, 2010. [ link | pdf ] T. Setzer, K. Bhattacharya, and H. Ludwig. Change scheduling based on business impact analysis of change-related risk. IEEE Transactions on Network and Service Management, Vol. 7(1):58–71, 2010. exclude. [ link ] B. Speitkamp and M. Bichler. A mathematical programming approach for server consolidation problems in virtualized data centers. IEEE Transactions on Services Computing, 3(4):266–278, 2010. [ link | pdf ] F. Brandt, F. Fischer, P. Harrenstein, and M. Mair. A computational analysis of the tournament equilibrium set. Social Choice and Welfare, 34(4):597–609, 2010. [ link | pdf ] F. Brandt and P. Harrenstein. Characterization of dominance relations in finite coalitional games. Theory and Decision, 69(2):233–256, 2010. [ link | pdf ] M. Bichler, A. Pikovsky, and T. Setzer. An analysis of design problems in combinatorial procurement auctions. Business & Information Systems Engineering, 51(1), 2009. [ link | pdf ] M. Bichler, P. Shabalin, and A. Pikovsky. A computational analysis of linear price iterative combinatorial auction formats. INFORMS Information Systems Research, 20(1):33–59, 2009. [ link | pdf ] T. Setzer, K. Bhattacharya, and H. Ludwig. System and method for automated decision support for service transition management. Patent, Oct. 30 2009. F. Brandt, F. Fischer, and M. Holzer. Symmetries and the complexity of pure Nash equilibrium. Journal of Computer and System Sciences, 75(3):163–177, 2009. [ link | pdf ] F. Brandt, F. Fischer, and P. Harrenstein. The computational complexity of choice sets. Mathematical Logic Quarterly, 55(4):444–459, 2009. Special Issue on Computational Social Choice. [ link | pdf ] F. Brandt. Some remarks on Dodgson's voting rule. Mathematical Logic Quarterly, 55(4):460–463, 2009. Special Issue on Computational Social Choice. [ link | pdf ] F. Brandt, M. Brill, F. Fischer, P. Harrenstein, and J. Hoffmann. Computing Shapley's saddles. ACM SIGecom Exchanges, 8(2), 2009. [ link | pdf ] F. Brandt, F. Fischer, P. Harrenstein, and Y. Shoham. Ranking games. Artificial Intelligence, 173(2):221–239, 2009. [ link | pdf ] M. Bichler. Kombinatorische Online-Verhandlung bei Audi - Wie Aristoteles irrte. Beschaffung aktuell, 9, 2008. C. Kiss and M. Bichler. Identification of influencers - measuring influence in customer networks. Decision Support Systems, 46(1):233–253, 2008. [ link | pdf ] A. Paschke and M. Bichler. Knowledge representation concepts for automated sla management. Decision Support Systems, 46(1):187–205, 2008. [ link | pdf ] F. Brandt and T. Sandholm. On the existence of unconditionally privacy-preserving auction protocols. ACM Transactions on Information and System Security, 11(2), 2008. [ link | pdf ] F. Brandt and F. Fischer. Computing the minimal covering set. Mathematical Social Sciences, 56(2):254–268, 2008. [ link | pdf ] M. Bichler and T. Setzer. Admission control for media on demand services. Service Oriented Computing and Application, 1(1):65–73, 2007. [ link ] R. Brandl, M. Bichler, and M. Ströbel. Cost accounting for shared it infrastructures - estimating resource utilization in distributed it architectures. Wirtschaftsinformatik, 49(2):83–94, 2007. [ link | pdf ] A. Paschke. Sla management regelbasiert. Computerwoche, 9, 2007. M. Bichler. Für Sie gelesen: Design Science in Information Systems Research. Business and Information Systems Engineering, 48(2):133–135, 2006. M. Bichler and J. Kalagnanam. Software frameworks for advanced procurement auction markets. Communications of the ACM (CACM), 49(12):104–108, 2006. [ link | pdf ] M. Bichler and J. Kalagnanam. A non-parametric estimator for setting reservation prices in procurement auctions. Information Technology and Management, 7(3):157–169, 2006. [ link | pdf ] M. Bichler and K. J. Lin. Service-oriented computing: Composition and qos issues in business services networks. IEEE Computer, 39(3):99–101, 2006. [ link ] M. Bichler, T. Setzer, and B. Speitkamp. A capacity planning and resource allocation method for virtualized servers. Patent, August 2006. M. Bichler and R. Steinberg. E-auctions in procurement operations. Production and Operations Management, 2006. T. Setzer, M. Bichler, and O. Hühn. Adaptive zugriffskontrollverfahren - ein entscheidungsmodell für die kontrolle des zugriffs auf gemeinsam genutzte it-infrastrukturen. Wirtschaftsinformatik, 48(4):246–256, 2006. [ link ] F. Brandt. How to obtain full privacy in auctions. International Journal of Information Security, 5(4):201–216, 2006. [ link | pdf ] M. Bichler and J.-Y. Chung. Special issues on service-oriented enterprise applications and web services composition. Information Systems and e-Business Management, June 2005. M. Bichler and J. Kalagnanam. Configurable offers and winner determination in multi-attribute auctions. European Journal of Operational Research, 160(2):380–394, 2005. [ link | pdf ] M. Bichler, A. Pikovsky, and T. Setzer. Kombinatorische auktionen in der betrieblichen beschaffung - eine analyse grundlegender entwurfsprobleme. Wirtschaftsinformatik, 47(2), 2005. [ link | pdf ] M. Bichler and T. Setzer. Verfahren zur steuerung eines zugriffs auf ressourcen eines datenverarbeitungssystems und steuerungsprogramm. Patent, September 12 2005. M. Bichler and G. Richter. How to get value out of it. Information Management & Consulting, 2004. M. Bichler. Special issue on business process integration and e-commerce infrastructure. Electronic Commerce Research Journal, 2003. M. Bichler. Special issue on electronic negotiations. Group Decisions and Negotiations, 2003. M. Bichler, G. Kersten, and S. Strecker. Towards a structured design of electronic negotiations. Group Decisions and Negotiations, 2003.
Skip to content
Menu
Google Custom Search
Wir verwenden Google für unsere Suche. Mit Klick auf „Suche aktivieren“ aktivieren Sie das Suchfeld und akzeptieren die Nutzungsbedingungen.