René Romen

E-Mail: romen@cit.tum.de
Phone: +49 (0) 89 289 - 17514
Fax: +49 (0) 89 289 - 17535

Office: Room 01.10.039
Boltzmannstr. 3
85748 Munich, Germany

Hours: by arrangement


Short Bio

I am a Phd student in the group of Prof. Brandt since February 2021. Before this, I studied Informatics at TUM from 2015 to 2020. I am interested in different topics in computational social choice, but often focus on probabilistic social choice. I mainly work with computer aided methods, such as SAT-solving, SMT-solving, linear programming and integer programming.

Publications

M. Bullinger and R. Romen. Stability in online coalition formation. In Proceedings of the 38th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI), 2024. Forthcoming.

F. Brandt, P. Lederer, and R. Romen. Relaxed notions of Condorcet-consistency and efficiency for strategyproof social decision schemes. Social Choice and Welfare, 2024. Forthcoming. [ link | pdf ]

M. Bullinger and R. Romen. Online coalition formation under random arrival or coalition dissolution. In Proceedings of the 31st Annual European Symposium on Algorithms (ESA), pages 27:1–27:18, 2023. [ pdf | venue ]

F. Brandt, M. Greger, and R. Romen. Towards a characterization of random serial dictatorship. 2023. Working paper. [ pdf ]

F. Brandt, P. Lederer, and R. Romen. Relaxed notions of Condorcet-consistency and efficiency for strategyproof social decision schemes. In Proceedings of the 21st International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS), pages 181–189, 2022. [ link | pdf | venue ]

R. Romen. Non-manipulable social decision schemes. Master's thesis, Technical University of Munich, 2020.

Teaching

Courses
  • Economics and Computation (SS 2022)
  • Computational Social Choice (WS 2021/22)
  • Economics and Computation (SS 2021)
Student Project supervision
  • Bachelor's thesis Finding minimal voting paradoxes for Dodgson's rule by Felix Heinermann
  • Master's thesis Locally Pareto Optimal Coalition Formation by David Gamsiz

Projects

I maintain and continue to develop the following Projects:

  • Voting.ml : A website that computes Maximal Lotteries and many other social choice functions. You can find extra functionality at pro.voting.ml.
  • Pnyx: A powerful and user friendly preference aggregation tool.

You can send feedback, questions, and request about these projects to me.