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Technical University of Munich
Technical University of Munich

René Romen

E-Mail: rene.romen@tum.de
Phone: +49 (0) 89 289 - 17514
Fax: +49 (0) 89 289 - 17535
Office: Room 01.10.039
Boltzmannstr. 3
85748 Munich, Germany
Hours: by arrangement

Short Bio

I am a Phd student in the group of Prof. Brandt since February 2021. Before this, I studied Informatics at TUM from 2015 to 2020. I am interested in different topics in computational social choice, but often focus on probabilistic social choice. I mainly work with computer aided methods, such as SAT-solving, SMT-solving, linear programming and integer programming.

Publications

F. Brandt, P. Lederer, and R. Romen. Relaxed notions of Condorcet-consistency and efficiency for strategyproof social decision schemes. In Proceedings of the 21st International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS), 2022. [ link | pdf | venue ]

R. Romen. Non-manipulable social decision schemes. Master's thesis, Technical University of Munich, 2020.

Teaching

Courses
Student Project supervision
  • Bachelor's thesis Finding minimal voting paradoxes for Dodgson's rule by Felix Heinermann
  • Master's thesis Locally Pareto Optimal Coalition Formation by David Gamsiz

Projects

I maintain and continue to develop the following Projects:

  • Voting.ml : A website that computes Maximal Lotteries and many other social choice functions. You can find extra functionality at pro.voting.ml.
  • Pnyx: A powerful and user friendly preference aggregation tool.

You can send feedback, questions, and request about these projects to me. If you are a Master/Bachelor student and are interested in developing websites/apps for social choice, e.g., as a Master/Bachelor thesis, you can contact me.

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