René Romen

E-Mail: romen@cit.tum.de
Phone: +49 (0) 89 289 - 17514
Fax: +49 (0) 89 289 - 17535

Office: Room 01.10.039
Boltzmannstr. 3
85748 Munich, Germany

Hours: by arrangement


Short Bio

I am a Phd student in the group of Prof. Brandt since February 2021. Before this, I studied Informatics at TUM from 2015 to 2020. I am interested in different topics in computational social choice, but often focus on probabilistic social choice. I mainly work with computer aided methods, such as SAT-solving, SMT-solving, linear programming and integer programming.

Publications

M. Bullinger and R. Romen. Stability in online coalition formation. In Proceedings of the 38th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI), pages 9537–9545, 2024. [ pdf | venue ]

F. Brandt, P. Lederer, and R. Romen. Relaxed notions of Condorcet-consistency and efficiency for strategyproof social decision schemes. Social Choice and Welfare, 63(1):19–55, 2024. [ link | pdf ]

M. Bullinger and R. Romen. Online coalition formation under random arrival or coalition dissolution. In Proceedings of the 31st European Symposium on Algorithms (ESA), pages 27:1–27:18, 2023. [ pdf | venue ]

F. Brandt, P. Lederer, and R. Romen. Relaxed notions of Condorcet-consistency and efficiency for strategyproof social decision schemes. In Proceedings of the 21st International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS), pages 181–189, 2022. [ link | pdf | venue ]

R. Romen. Non-manipulable social decision schemes. Master's thesis, Technical University of Munich, 2020.

Teaching

Courses
  • Economics and Computation (SS 2024)
  • Computational Social Choice (WS 2023/24)
  • Economics and Computation (SS 2023)
  • Computational Social Choice (WS 2022/23)
  • Economics and Computation (SS 2022)
  • Computational Social Choice (WS 2021/22)
  • Economics and Computation (SS 2021)
Student Project supervision
  • Bachelor's thesis Finding minimal voting paradoxes for Dodgson's rule by Felix Heinermann
  • Master's thesis Locally Pareto Optimal Coalition Formation by David Gamsiz
  • IDP Minimal Voting Paradoxes for Approval-Based Committe Elections by Tabea Frisch
  • Master's thesis Weighted Topological Distance Games by Ismet Ćosić
  • IDP Deterministic Extreme Point Property in Social Choice by Zsofia Biegl

Projects

I maintain and continue to develop the following Projects:

  • Voting.ml : A website that computes Maximal Lotteries and many other social choice functions. You can find extra functionality at pro.voting.ml.
  • Pnyx: A powerful and user friendly preference aggregation tool.

You can send feedback, questions, and request about these projects to me.