Patrick Becker
E-Mail: patrick.becker@tum.de
Phone: +49 (0) 89 289 - 17537
Fax: +49 (0) 89 289 - 17535
Office: Room 01.10.040
Boltzmannstr. 3
85748 Munich, Germany
Short Bio
I am a Ph.D. student in Felix Brandt’s group since September 2025. Before starting my doctorate, I completed a Bachelor’s degree in Computer Science at LMU and a Master’s degree in Computer Science at TUM. My research focuses on the allocation of public goods, with interests ranging from budget aggregation to multi-winner approval voting. Moreover, I am particularly interested in questions around equilibria and the core in collective decision-making.
Publications
P. Becker, F. Brandt, and S. Rammohan.
Efficient and envy-free random assignment beyond expected
utility.
2026.
Working paper.
[ pdf ]
P. Becker, N. Boehmer, F. Frank, and L. Glessen.
Fractional Pareto-optimality in multiwinner voting.
Technical report, https://arxiv.org/abs/2606.11160, 2026.
[ pdf ]
P. Becker, A. Fries, M. Greger, and E. Segal-Halevi.
Efficiently computing equilibria in budget-aggregation games.
In Proceedings of the 25th International Conference on
Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS), pages 1304–1313, 2026.
[ link |
pdf |
venue ]
P. Becker and F. Frank.
On minimal achievable quotas in multiwinner voting.
In Proceedings of the 25th International Conference on
Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS), pages 828–836, 2026.
[ link |
pdf |
venue ]
P. Becker, M. Greger, and D. Peters.
Core existence in approval-based committee elections with up to
five voter types.
Technical report, https://arxiv.org/abs/2605.06194, 2026.
[ pdf ]
Teaching
- Advanced Topics in Computational Social Choice (SS 2026)
- Computational Social Choice (WS 2025/26)
- Economics and Computation (SS 2025)
Thesis Supervision
- Budget Aggregation with Cobb-Douglas Preferences
- On the Private Provision of Public Goods with Leontief Preferences
