Short Bio

I am a postdoctoral researcher at the Technical University of Munich in the Chair of Decision Sciences and Systems. Before this, I was a postdoctoral researcher at the Centrum Wiskunde & Informatica (CWI) in Amsterdam in the Networks & Optimization group, hosted by Guido Schäfer. I completed my PhD in 2023 at the Department of Informatics of the Athens University of Economics and Business, advised by Vangelis Markakis. My research interests include algorithmic mechanism design, auctions, and online algorithms. For more information, please visit my webpage.

Publications

Journal Publications

G. Amanatidis, B. Berger, T. Ezra, M. Feldman, F. Fusco, R. Reiffenhäuser, and A. Tsikiridis. Pandora’s Box Problem with Time Constraints. Artificial Intelligence (AIJ), to appear.

G. Amanatidis, S. Klumper, E. Markakis, G. Schäfer, and A. Tsikiridis. Partial Allocations in Budget-Feasible Mechanism Design: Bridging Multiple Levels of Service and Divisible Agents. ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation, vol. 13, pp. 1–28, 2025.

G. Birmpas, G. Markakis, O. Telelis, and A. Tsikiridis. Tight Welfare Guarantees for Pure Nash Equilibria of the Uniform Price Auction. Theory of Computing Systems, vol. 63, pp. 1451–1469, 2019.

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In Conference Proceedings

R. Colini-Baldeschi, S. Klumper, T. Kroll, S. Leonardi, G. Schäfer, and A. Tsikiridis. Optimal Type-Dependent Liquid Welfare Guarantees for Autobidding Agents with Budgets. In Proceedings of the 37th ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms (SODA 2026).

G. Amanatidis, E. Markakis, C. Santorinaios, G. Schäfer, P. Tsamopoulos, and A. Tsikiridis. Online Budget-Feasible Mechanism Design with Predictions. In Proceedings of the 18th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT 2025).

G. Amanatidis, F. Fusco, R. Reiffenhäuser, and A. Tsikiridis. Pandora’s Box Problem Over Time. In Proceedings of the 20th Conference on Web and Internet Economics (WINE 2024).

R. Colini-Baldeschi, S. Klumper, G. Schäfer, and A. Tsikiridis. To Trust or Not to Trust: Assignment Mechanisms with Predictions in the Private Graph Model. In Proceedings of the 25th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC 2024).

G. Amanatidis, S. Klumper, E. Markakis, G. Schäfer, and A. Tsikiridis. Partial Allocations in Budget-Feasible Mechanism Design: Bridging Multiple Levels of Service and Divisible Agents. In Proceedings of the 19th Conference on Web and Internet Economics (WINE 2023).

E. Markakis, G. Papasotiropoulos, and A. Tsikiridis. On Improved Interval Cover Mechanisms for Crowdsourcing Markets. In Proceedings of the 15th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT 2022).

E. Markakis, A. Sgouritsa, and A. Tsikiridis. Towards a Characterization of Worst Case Equilibria in the Discriminatory Price Auction. In Proceedings of the 17th Conference on Web and Internet Economics (WINE 2021).

E. Markakis and A. Tsikiridis. On Core-Selecting and Core-Competitive Mechanisms for Binary Single-Parameter Auctions. In Proceedings of the 15th Conference on Web and Internet Economics (WINE 2019).

G. Birmpas, E. Markakis, O. Telelis, and A. Tsikiridis. Tight Welfare Guarantees for Pure Nash Equilibria of the Uniform Price Auction. In Proceedings of the 10th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT 2017), Best Paper Award.

Service

Program Committees

• EC 2025
• WINE 2024–2025
• The Web Conference (WWW) 2026
• AAAI 2026
• IJCAI 2025
• AAMAS 2025–2026
• ECAI 2024–2025
• SAGT 2023, 2025

Journal Reviewing

• Naval Research Logistics (2025)
• Theoretical Computer Science (2023–2025)
• JAAMAS (2025)

Additional Conference Reviewing

• STOC 2025
• SODA 2026
• EC 2020, 2022, 2024
• WINE 2017–2021
• ITCS 2020
• ICALP 2017, 2019, 2025
• AAMAS 2018
• SAGT 2022, 2024
• STACS 2024

Teaching

Teaching Assistant for Business Analytics and Machine Learning (IN2028), WS 25/26