Publications

M. Bichler, A. Gupta, L. Mathews, and M. Oberlechner. Low revenue in display ad auctions: Algorithmic collusion vs. non-quasilinear preferences. Working Paper, (12), 2023. [ DOI | http ]

M. Bichler, S. B. Lunowa, M. Oberlechner, F. R. Pieroth, and B. Wohlmuth. On the convergence of learning algorithms in bayesian auction games. Working Paper, (12), 2023. [ DOI | .pdf ]

M. Şeref Ahunbay, M. Bichler, T. Dobos, and J. Knörr. Solving large-scale electricity market pricing problems in polynomial time. Working Paper, 2023. [ arXiv | http ]

M. Bichler, M. Fichtl, and M. Oberlechner. Computing bayes nash equilibrium strategies in auction games via simultaneous online dual averaging. Operations Research, 2023. [ DOI ]

E. Batziou and M. Bichler. Budget-feasible market design for biodiversity conservation: Considering incentives and spatial coordination. In Wirtschaftsinformatik (WI), 2023. [ http ]

M. Bichler and J. Knörr. Getting prices right on electricity spot markets: On the economic impact of advanced power flow models. Energy Economics, 126:106968, 2023. [ DOI ]

M. Ahunbay, M. Bichler, and J. Knörr. Challenges in designing electricity spot markets. NBER Proceedings in Market Design, 2023.

D. Zhu, S. Minner, and M. Bichler. Information design for on-demand service platforms: A queueing-theoretic approach. SSRN, (1):1–55, 2023. [ DOI | http ]

N. Kohring, F. R. Pieroth, and M. Bichler. Enabling first-order gradient-based learning for equilibrium computation in markets. In International Conference on Machine Learning. PMLR, 2023.

M. Ahunbay, M. Bichler, and J. Knoerr. Pricing optimal outcomes in coupled and non-convex markets: Theory and applications to electricity markets. In ACM Economics and Computation. ACM, 2023.

M. Bichler, N. Kohring, M. Oberlechner, and F. Pieroth. Learning equilibrium in bilateral bargaining games. European Journal on Operational Research, 311(2):660–678, December 2023. [ DOI | pdf ]

M. Bichler, S. Heidekrueger, and N. Kohring. Learning equilibria in asymmetric auction games. INFORMS Journal on Computing, 35(3):519–709, C2, August 2023. [ DOI | link ]

M. Bichler, M. Fichtl, and M. Oberlechner. Computing bayes nash equilibrium strategies in auction games via simultaneous online dual averaging. ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, Juli 2023. [ DOI | pdf ]

G. Schwarz and M. Bichler. How to trade thirty thousand products: A wholesale market design for road capacity. Transportation Research Part A, 164:167–185, October 2022. [ DOI | link ]

M. Bichler, P. Gritzmann, P. Karaenke, and M. Ritter. On airport time slot auctions: A market design complying with the IATA scheduling guidelines. Transportation Science, 57(1):27–51, August 2022. [ DOI | link ]

M. Bichler, M. Ewert, and M. Oberlechner. Computing bayes nash equilibrium strategies in crowdsourcing contests. In 32nd Workshop on Information Technologies and Systems (WITS 2022), Copenhagen, 2022.

N. Kohring, C. Fröhlich, S. Heidekrüger, and M. Bichler. Equilibrium computation for auction games via multi-swarm optimization. In AAAI-22 Workshop on Reinforcement Learning in Games (AAAI-RLG 22), Online, Online, February 2022. [ pdf ]

M. Ewert, S. Heidekrüger, and M. Bichler. Approaching the overbidding puzzle in all-pay auctions: Explaining human behavior through bayesian optimization and equilibrium learning. In Proceedings of the 21st International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Learning, 2022. [ pdf ]

E. Baldwin, M. Bichler, M. Fichtl, and P. Klemperer. Strong substitutes: structural properties, and a new algorithm for competitive equilibrium prices. Mathematical Programming, 191(2):1436–4646, 2022. [ DOI | pdf ]

M. Ş. Ahunbay, M. Bichler, and J. Knörr. Pricing optimal outcomes in coupled and non-convex electricity markets. In 32nd Workshop on Information Technologies and Systems (WITS 2022), Copenhagen, 2022.

M. Ş. Ahunbay, A. Ashour Novirdoust, R. Bhuiyan, M. Bichler, S. Bindu, E. Bjørndal, M. Bjørndal, H. U. Buhl, J. P. Chaves-Ávila, H. Gerard, S. Gross, L. Hanny, J. Knörr, C. S. Köhnen, L. Marques, A. Monti, K. Neuhoff, C. Neumann, E. Ocenic, M. Ott, M. Pichlmeier, J. C. Richstein, M. Rinck, F. Röhrich, P. M. Röhrig, A. Sauer, J. Strüker, M. Troncia, J. Wagner, M. Weibelzahl, and P. Zilke. Electricity market design 2030-2050: Shaping future electricity markets for a climate-neutral europe. 2022. [ DOI ]

M. Bichler, J. Knörr, and F. Maldonado. Pricing in non-convex markets: How to price electricity in the presence of demand response. Information Systems Research, 34(2):652–675, July 2022. [ DOI | pdf ]

M. Bichler, H. U. Buhl, J. Knörr, F. Maldonado, P. Schott, S. Waldherr, and M. Weibelzahl. Electricity markets in a time of change: A call to arms for business research. Schmalenbach Journal of Business Research, 74:77–102, 2022. [ DOI | link ]

M. Bichler, P. Milgrom, and G. Schwarz. Taming the communication and computation complexity of combinatorial auctions: The FUEL bid language. Management Science, 69(4):2217–2238, June 2022. [ DOI | link | pdf ]

E. Batziou, M. Bichler, and M. Fichtl. Core-stability in assignment markets with financially constrained buyers. ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 23, 2022. [ DOI | pdf ]

G. Schwarz and M. Bichler. Designing a large-scale wholesale market for urban congestion pricing. In Proceedings of the 17th International Conference on Wirtschaftsinformatik, Nürnberg, Germany, 2022. [ .pdf ]

M. Fichtl, M. Oberlechner, and M. Bichler. Computing distributional bayes nash equilibria in auction games via gradient dynamics. In AAAI-22 Workshop on Reinforcement Learning in Games (AAAI-RLG 22), Online, Online, 2022. [ pdf | .pdf ]

M. Bichler, M. Fichtl, S. Heidekrüger, N. Kohring, and P. Sutterer. Learning equilibria in symmetric auction games using artificial neural networks. Nature Machine Intelligence, 3:687–695, August 2021. [ DOI | link | pdf ]

A. Ashour Novirdoust, M. Bichler, C. Bojung, H. U. Buhl, G. Fridgen, V. Gretschko, L. Hanny, J. Knörr, F. Maldonado, K. Neuhoff, C. Neumann, M. Ott, J. C. Richstein, M. Rinck, M. Schöpf, P. Schott, A. Sitzmann, J. Wagner, J. Wagner, and M. Weibelzahl. Electricity spot market design 2030-2050. 2021. [ DOI ]

A. Ashour Novirdoust, R. Bhuiyan, M. Bichler, H. U. Buhl, G. Fridgen, C. Fugger, V. Gretschko, L. Hanny, J. Knörr, K. Neuhoff, C. Neumann, M. Ott, J. C. Richstein, M. Rinck, F. Röhrich, M. Schöpf, A. Sitzmann, J. Wagner, and M. Weibelzahl. Electricity market design 2030-2050: Moving towards implementation. 2021. [ DOI ]

M. Bichler, J. Knörr, and F. Maldonado. Electricity pricing and minimum make-whole payments in the presence of non-convexities and price-sensitive demand. In 31st Workshop on Information Technologies and Systems (WITS 2021), Austin, TX, 2021. [ pdf ]

M. Bichler and S. Merting. Randomized scheduling mechanisms: Assigning course seats in a fair and efficient way. Production and Operations Management, 30(10):3540–3559, October 2021. [ DOI | link | pdf ]

M. Bichler and S. Waldherr. Core-pricing in combinatorial exchanges with financially constrained buyers: Computational hardness and algorithmic solutions. Operations Research, 70(1):241–264, November 2021. [ DOI | pdf ]

S. Heidekrüger, N. Kohring, P. Sutterer, and M. Bichler. Equilibrium learning in combinatorial auctions: Computing approximate bayesian nash equilibria via pseudogradient dynamics. In AAAI-21 Workshop on Reinforcement Learning in Games (AAAI-RLG 21), Online, Online, 2021.

S. Heidekrüger, N. Kohring, P. Sutterer, and M. Bichler. Multiagent learning for equilibrium computation in auction markets. In AAAI Spring Symposium on Challenges and Opportunities for Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning (COMARL-21), Online, Online, 2021.

M. Bichler, R. Littmann, and S. Waldherr. Trading airport time slots: Market design with complex constraints. Transportation Research Part B: Methodological, 145:118–133, March 2021. [ DOI | pdf ]

G. Schwarz and M. Bichler. How to trade thirty thousand products: A wholesale market design for road capacity. In Workshop on Information Technology and Systems (WITS21), Austin, Texas, 2021.

M. Fichtl, M. Oberlechner, and M. Bichler. Approximating bayes nash equilibria in auction games via gradient dynamics. In 2021 NeurIPS Workshops on Strategic Machine Learning, Online, Online, 2021.

M. Bichler. Der Nobelpreis für Wirtschaftswissenschaften 2020 und seine Bezüge zum Operations Research. OR News, 69(3), 2020. [ link | pdf ]

M. Bichler. Comments on: Shared resources in collaborative vehicle routing. TOP, 28:21–24, April 2020. [ DOI ]

M. Bichler, M. Fichtl, and G. Schwarz. Walrasian equilibria from an optimization perspective: A guide to the literature. Naval Research Logistics, 68(4):496–513, 2020. [ DOI ]

M. Bichler, V. Grimm, S. Kretschmer, and P. Sutterer. Market design for renewable energy auctions: An analysis of alternative auction formats. Energy Economics, 92:104904, October 2020. [ DOI ]

M. Bichler, Z. Hao, R. Littmann, and S. Waldherr. Strategyproof auction mechanisms for network procurement. OR Spectrum, 42(3):965–994, 2020. [ DOI | pdf ]

M. Bichler, T. Morrill, and S. Waldherr. How to assign scarce resources without money: Designing information systems that are efficient, truthful, and (pretty) fair. INFORMS Information Systems Research, 32(2):335–355, 2020. [ DOI | link | pdf ]

S. Heidekrüger, P. Sutterer, N. Kohring, and M. Bichler. Learning bayesian nash equilibria in auction games. In INFORMS Workshop on Data Science, Online, 2020.

S. Heidekrüger, P. Sutterer, N. Kohring, and M. Bichler. Equilibrium learning in combinatorial auctions: Computing approximate bayesian nash equilibria via pseudogradient dynamics. In Workshop on Information Technology and Systems (WITS20), Online, Online, 2020.

P. Karaenke, M. Bichler, S. Merting, and S. Minner. Non-monetary coordination mechanisms for time slot allocation in warehouse delivery. European Journal of Operational Research, 286(3):897–907, 2020. [ DOI | pdf | http ]

R. Littmann, B. M., and W. S. Incentive-compatible auction mechanisms for network procurement. In Proceedings of the 15th International Conference on Wirtschaftsinformatik, Potsdam, Germany, 2020.

R. Littmann and B. M. Real-time dynamic congestion pricing: An online optimization approach. In Workshop on Information Technology and Systems (WITS20), Online, 2020.

P. Paulsen, M. Bichler, and G. Kokott. The beauty of Dutch: Bidding behavior in combinatorial first-price procurement auctions. European Journal of Operational Research, 291(2):711–721, 2020. [ DOI ]

M. Bichler, P. Milgrom, and G. Schwarz. Taming the communication and computation complexity of combinatorial auctions: The fuel bid language. In Conference on Information Systems and Technology (CIST2020), 7. November 2020, Online, 2020.

M. Bichler, V. Fux, and J. Goeree. Designing environmental markets for trading catch shares. INFORMS Journal on Applied Analytics, 49(5):324–337, 2019. [ DOI ]

M. Bichler, S. Merting, and A. Uzunoglu. Matching with bundle preferences: Tradeoff between fairness and truthfulness. In T. Ludwig and V. Pipek, editors, Proceedings of the 14th International Conference on Wirtschaftsinformatik, pages 378 – 392. Universität Siegen, 2019.

M. Bichler, S. Merting, and A. Uzunoglu. Assigning course schedules: About preference elicitation, fairness, and truthfulness. In TBA, editor, Proceedings of the International Conference on Information Systems (ICIS 2019), page TBA. TBA, 2019.

M. Bichler and S. Waldherr. Competitive equilibria in combinatorial exchanges with financially constrained buyers: Computational hardness and algorithmic solutions. ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 20, 2019. [ pdf ]

S. Heidekrüger, P. Sutterer, and M. Bichler. Computing approximate bayes-nash equilibria through neural self-play. In Workshop on Information Technology and Systems (WITS19), Munich, Germany, 2019.

P. Karaenke, M. Bichler, and S. Minner. Coordination is hard: Electronic auction mechanisms for increased efficiency in transportation logistics. Management Science, 65(12):5449–5956, 2019. [ DOI | link | pdf ]

G. Kokott, M. Bichler, and P. Paulsen. The beauty of Dutch: Ex-post split-award auctions in procurement markets with diseconomies of scale. European Journal on Operational Research, 278(1):202–210, 2019. [ DOI | pdf ]

G. Kokott, M. Bichler, and P. Paulsen. First-price split-award auctions in procurement markets with economies of scale. Production and Operations Management, 28(3):721–739, March 2019. [ DOI | link | pdf ]

R. Littmann, B. M., and W. S. Combinatorial exchanges for airport time slots. In Workshop on Information Technology and Systems (WITS19), Munich, Germany, 2019.

P. Sutterer, B. M., G. V., and K. S. Building up renewable energy: A market design for wind auctions. In Workshop on Information Technology and Systems (WITS19), Munich, Germany, 2019.

P. Sutterer, S. Waldherr, and M. Bichler. Are truthful bidders paying too much? Efficiency and revenue in display ad auctions. ACM Transactions on Management Information Systems, 10(2):1–18, 2019. [ DOI ]

W. van der Aalst, M. Bichler, and A. Heinzl. Robotic process automation. Business & Information Systems Engineering, 60(4):269–272, 2018. [ DOI ]

M. Bichler. Views on the past, present, and future of business and information systems engineering. Business & Information Systems Engineering, 60(6):443–477, 2018. [ DOI | pdf ]

M. Bichler, S. Fadaei, and D. Kraft. A simple and fast algorithm for convex decomposition in relax-and-round mechanisms. Computers and Operations Research, 103:277–287, 2018. [ DOI | pdf ]

M. Bichler, V. Fux, and J. Goeree. A matter of equality: Linear pricing in combinatorial exchanges. INFORMS Information Systems Research, 29(4):1024–1043, 2018. [ DOI | link | pdf ]

M. Bichler, V. Fux, and J. Goeree. Designing combinatorial exchanges for the reallocation of resource rights. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences (PNAS), 116(3):786–791, 2018. [ DOI | link ]

M. Bichler and S. Merting. Truthfulness in advertising? approximation mechanisms for knapsack bidders. European Journal of Operational Research, 270(2):775–783, 2018. [ DOI | link ]

M. Bichler, S. Merting, and A. Uzunoglu. Assigning course schedules: About preference elicitation, fairness, and truthfulness. CoRR, abs/1812.02630, 2018. [ arXiv | link ]

M. Bichler and P. Paulsen. A principal-agent model of bidding firms in multi-unit auctions. Games and Economic Behavior, 111:20–40, September 2018. [ DOI | link | pdf ]

A. Goetzendorff, M. Bichler, and J. K. Goeree. Synergistic valuations and efficiency in spectrum auctions. Telecommunications Policy, 42(1):91–105, 2018. [ DOI | pdf | http ]

A. Heinzl, W. van der Aalst, and M. Bichler. Why the community should care about technology-centric journal rankings. Business & Information Systems Engineering, 60(2):91–93, 2018. [ DOI ]

W. van der Aalst, M. Bichler, and A. Heinzl. Responsible data science. Business and Information Systems Engineering, 59(5), 2017.

S. Albers, M. Bichler, F. Brandt, P. Gritzmann, and R. Kolisch. Algorithmic economics und operations research. Informatik Spektrum, 40(2):165–171, 2017. [ link | pdf ]

M. Bichler and J. K. Goeree. Frontiers in spectrum auction design. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 50:372–391, 2017. [ DOI | link ]

M. Bichler, V. Gretschko, and M. Janssen. Bargaining in spectrum auctions: a review of the german auction in 2015. Telecommunications Policy, 41(5-6):325–340, 2017. [ DOI | link | pdf ]

M. Bichler, Z. Hao, and G. Adomavicius. Coalition-based pricing in ascending combinatorial auctions. Information Systems Research, 28(1):159–179, 2017. [ link | pdf ]

M. Bichler, A. Heinzl, and W. van der Aalst. Business analytics and data science: Once again? Business and Information Systems Engineering, 58(2), 2017.

M. Bichler and S. Waldherr. Core and pricing equilibria in combinatorial exchanges. Economics Letters, 157:145 – 147, 2017. [ DOI | http ]

F. Diebold and M. Bichler. Matching with indifferences: A comparison of algorithms in the context of course allocation. European Journal of Operational Research, 260(1):268–282, 2017. [ link | pdf ]

S. Fadaei and M. Bichler. Generalized assignment problem: Truthful mechanism design without money. Operations Research Letters, 45(1):72–76, 2017. [ pdf ]

S. Fadaei and M. Bichler. Truthfulness with value-maximizing bidders: On the limits of approximation in combinatorial markets. European Journal of Operational Research, 260(2):767–777, 2017. [ link | pdf ]

S. Fadaei and M. Bichler. A truthful mechanism for the generalized assignment problem. ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation (TEAC), 5(3):14, 2017. [ DOI | link | pdf ]

A. Heinzl, M. Bichler, and W. van der Aalst. Trans-national joint research projects - defying the odds of national inter-university competition. Business and Information Systems Engineering, 59(4), 2017.

A. Heinzl, M. Bichler, and W. van der Aalst. Trans-national joint research projects. Business & Information Systems Engineering, 59(4), 2017.

P. Sutterer, S. Waldherr, and M. Bichler. Are truthful bidders paying too much? efficiency and revenue in display ad auctions. In Workshop on Information Technology and Systems (WITS17), Seoul, South Korea, 2017.

W. van der Aalst, M. Bichler, and A. Heinzl. Open research in business and information systems engineering. Business and Information Systems Engineering, 57(6), 2016.

M. Bichler, V. Fux, and J. Goeree. Linear payment rules for combinatorial exchanges. In International Conference on Information Systems (ICIS 2016), Dublin, 2016.

M. Bichler, A. Heinzl, and W. van der Aalst. Bise and the engineering sciences. Business & Information Systems Engineering, 58(2), 2016.

S. Fadaei and M. Bichler. Truthfulness and approximation with value-maximizing bidders. In Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory, 2016. [ link ]

K. Guler, M. Bichler, and J. Petrakis. Ascending combinatorial auctions with risk averse bidders. INFORMS Group Decision and Negotiation, 25(3):609–639, May 2016. [ link | pdf ]

A. Heinzl, M. Bichler, and W. van der Aalst. Disciplinary pluralism, flagship conferences, and journal submissions. Business and Information Systems Engineering, 58(4), 2016.

C. Kroemer, M. Bichler, and A. Goetzendorff. (Un)expected bidder behavior in spectrum auctions. INFORMS Group Decision and Negotiation, 25(1):31–63, 2016. [ link | pdf ]

S. Merting, P. Karaenke, and M. Bichler. Strategy-Proof Assignment of Bundles with Ordinal Preferences: An Application in Retail Logistics. In V. Nissen, D. Stelzer, S. Straßburger, and D. Fischer, editors, Multikonferenz Wirtschaftsinformatik (MKWI) 2016: Band I, pages 205–216. Universitätsverlag Ilmenau, 2016. [ pdf ]

P. Paulsen and M. Bichler. A principal-agent model of bidding firms in multi-unit auctions. In International Conference on Information Systems (ICIS 2016), 2016.

A. Woke, M. Bichler, F. Chirigati, and V. Steeves. Reproducible experiments on dynamic resource allocation in cloud data centers. Information Systems, 59:98–101, 2016. [ DOI | link | pdf ]

A. Wolke, M. Bichler, and T. Setzer. Planning vs. dynamic control: Resource allocation in corporate clouds. IEEE Transactions on Cloud Computing, 4(3):322–335, 2016. [ link | pdf ]

M. Bichler, K. Guler, and S. Mayer. Split-award procurement auctions: Can Bayesian equilibrium strategies predict human bidding behavior in multi-object auctions? Production and Operations Management, 24(6):1012–1027, June 2015. [ link | pdf ]

M. Bichler and G. Hao, Z. Adomavicius. Coordination and pricing in multi-object auctions. In Proceedings of the International Conference on Information Systems (ICIS), Fort Worth, TX, USA, 2015.

M. Bichler, A. Heinzl, and R. Winter. Practice impact of IS research. Business and Information Systems Engineering, 57(2), 2015.

A. Goetzendorff, M. Bichler, B. Day, and P. Shabalin. Compact bid languages and core-pricing in large multi-object auctions. Management Science, 61(7):1684 – 1703, 2015. [ DOI | link | pdf ]

A. Heinzl, R. Winter, and M. Bichler. Internationalization of information systems research and teaching. Business and Information Systems Engineering, 57(4), 2015.

P. Karaenke, M. Bichler, and S. Minner. Retail warehouse loading dock coordination by core-selecting package auctions. In Proceedings of the 23rd European Conference on Information Systems (ECIS 2015), May, 26–29, Muenster, Germany, 2015. [ pdf ]

P. Paulsen and M. Bichler. Why bidders do not reduce demand in multi-unit auctions. In International Conference on Group Decision & Negotiation, 2015.

P. Paulsen and M. Bichler. Why bidders do not reduce demand in multi-unit auctions. In Conference on Economic Design, Istanbul, 2015.

P. Paulsen and M. Bichler. Bidding with allowances: Moral hazard in package auctions. In Conference on Information Systems and Technology (CIST 2015), 2015.

R. Winter, M. Bichler, and A. Heinzl. Teaching: The little brother of research. Business and Information Systems Engineering, 57(6), 2015.

A. Woke, B. Tsend-Ayush, C. Pfeiffer, and M. Bichler. More than bin packing: On dynamic resource allocation strategies in cloud computing. Information Systems, 51(C):83–95, 2015. [ link | pdf ]

M. Bichler. Reflections on design science research in information systems. Business and Information Systems Engineering, 56(1):3, 2014.

M. Bichler, J. Goeree, S. Mayer, and P. Shabalin. Spectrum auction design: Simple auctions for complex sales. Telecommunications Policy, 38:613–622, 2014. [ link | pdf ]

M. Bichler, K. Guler, and S. Mayer. Split-award procurement auctions. In VHB Jahrestagung, 2014.

M. Bichler, T. Hass, P. Loos, and R. Krishnan. Research areas in business and information systems engineering. Business and Information Systems Engineering, 56(1):2, 2014.

F. Diebold, H. Aziz, M. Bichler, F. Matthes, and A. Schneider. Course allocation via stable matching. Business and Information Systems Engineering, 56(2):111–125, 2014. [ link | pdf ]

S. Fadaei and M. Bichler. A truthful-in-expectation mechanism for the generalized assignment problem. In Web and Internet Economics, pages 247–248. Springer, 2014. [ link | pdf ]

Z. Hao, M. Bichler, and G. Adomavicius. Efficiency and rapid convergence: Coalition-based pricing in ascending. In VHB Jahrestagung, 2014.

D. Kraft, S. Fadaei, and M. Bichler. Fast convex decomposition for truthful social welfare approximation. In Web and Internet Economics, pages 120–132. Springer, 2014. [ link | pdf ]

C. Kroemer, M. Bichler, and A. Goetzendorff. (Un)expected bidder behavior in spectrum auctions. In WITS 2014, Auckland, NZ, 2014.

J. Lemke, M. Bichler, and S. Minner. Fighting waiting times at the retail warehouse. In International Scientific Symposium on Logistics, 2014.

M. Bichler. Market Design - Foundations and Applications. In W. Abramowicz, editor, Business Information Systems, Lecture Notes in Business Information Processing. Springer, 2013.

M. Bichler, P. Shabalin, and J. Wolf. Do core-selecting combinatorial clock auctions always lead to high efficiency? An experimental analysis of spectrum auction designs. Experimental Economics, 16(4):511–545, 2013. [ link | pdf ]

M. Bichler, P. Shabalin, and G. Ziegler. Efficiency with linear prices? A theoretical and experimental analysis of the combinatorial clock auction. INFORMS Information Systems Research, 24(2):394–417, 2013. [ link | pdf ]

A. Goetzendorff, M. Bichler, and R. Day. Core-pricing in large multi-object auctions: a market design for selling tv-ads. In Conference on Information Systems and Technology, 2013.

C. Hass, M. Bichler, and K. Guler. Optimization-based decision support for scenario analysis in sourcing markets with economies of scale and scope. Electronic Commerce Research and Applications, 12(3):152–165, 2013. [ link ]

I. Petrakis, G. Ziegler, and M. Bichler. Ascending combinatorial auctions with allocation constraints: Game-theoretical and computational properties of generic pricing rules. INFORMS Information Systems Research, 24(3):768–786, 2013. [ link | pdf ]

A. Wolke, M. Bichler, and T. Setzer. Energy efficient virtual machine allocation in data centers: real-time control versus offline planning. In Workshop on Information Technology and Systems (WITS13), Milan, Italy, 2013.

M. Bichler, Z. Hao, and C. Kroemer. Coordination support in ascending core-selecting combinatorial auctions. In Conference on Information Technologies and Systems (CIST12), Phoenix, AZ, USA, 2012.

K. Guler, I. Petrakis, and M. Bichler. Equilibrium bidding in ascending combinatorial auctions with risk averse bidders. In Conference on Information Systems and Technology (CIST), Phoenix, Arizona, USA, 2012. [ link ]

K. Guler, X. Zhen, S. Mayer, and M. Bichler. Strategic bidding in procurement auctions with multiple lots. In Informs, Phoenix, Arizona, USA, 2012. [ link ]

C. Hass, M. Bichler, and K. Guler. Optimization-based decision support for scenario analysis in sourcing markets with economies of scale and scope. In Workshop on Information Technology and Systems (WITS12), Orlando, FL, USA, 2012.

S. Mayer, P. Shabalin, and M. Bichler. Efficiency, auctioneer revenue, and bidding behavior in the combinatorial clock auction. In Perhaps experimental economics, Nov 12 2012.

I. Petrakis, C. Hass, and M. Bichler. On the impact of real-time information on field service scheduling. Decision Support Systems, 53(2):282–293, 2012. [ link | pdf ]

T. Scheffel, G. Ziegler, and M. Bichler. On the impact of package selection in combinatorial auctions: An experimental study in the context of spectrum auction design. Experimental Economics, 15(4):667–692, 2012. [ link | pdf ]

M. Seibold, A. Wolke, M. Albutiu, M. Bichler, A. Kemper, and T. Setzer. Efficient deployment of main-memory dbms in virtualized data centers. In 2013 IEEE Sixth International Conference on Cloud Computing, volume 0, pages 311–318, Los Alamitos, CA, USA, 2012. IEEE Computer Society. [ DOI ]

T. Setzer and M. Bichler. Using matrix approximation for high-dimensional server allocation problems. European Journal on Operational Research, 227(1):62–75, 2012. [ link | pdf ]

M. Bichler and K. Battacharya. It-service-management und it-automation: Methoden und modelle für effizienten it-betrieb (editorial). Business and Information Systems Engineering, 53(1):2, 2011.

M. Bichler, A. Gupta, and W. Ketter. Designing smart markets. INFORMS Information Systems Research, 21(4):688–699, 2011. [ link ]

M. Bichler, S. Schneider, K. Guler, and M. Sayal. Compact bidding languages and supplier selection for markets with economies of scale and scope. European Journal on Operational Research, 214(1):67–77, 2011. [ link | pdf ]

M. Bichler, P. Shabalin, and J. Wolf. Efficiency, auctioneer revenue, and bidding behavior in the combinatorial clock auction. In The Se Conference on Auctions, Market Mechanisms and Their Applications, New York, 2011. ACM.

T. Dierkes, M. Bichler, and R. Krishnan. Estimating the effect of word of mouth on churn and cross-buying in the mobile phone market with markov logic networks. Decision Support Systems, 51(3):361–371, 2011. [ link | pdf ]

R. Jacob, T. Scheffel, G. Ziegler, and M. Bichler. Hierarchical package bidding: Computational complexity & bidder behavior. In The Second Conference on Auctions, Market Mechanisms and Their Applications (AMMA), New York, 2011. ACM.

I. Petrakis, G. Ziegler, and M. Bichler. Theoretical foundations of iterative combinatorial auctions with side constraints: Computational properties of generic pricing rules. In Conference on Information Systems and Technology (CIST), Charlotte, North Carolina, USA, 2011. [ link | pdf ]

T. Scheffel, A. Pikovsky, M. Bichler, and K. Guler. An experimental comparison of linear and non-linear price combinatorial auctions. INFORMS Information Systems Research, 22(2):346–368, 2011. [ link | pdf ]