Guided Research Franz Diebold
Abstract
We present the result of field experiments on three dierent types of course allocation mechanisms. These mechanisms include a first come, first served algorithm used in many universities and two stable matching mechanisms, the Gale-Shapley student optimal stable mechanism (SOSM), and the eciency adjusted deferred acceptance mechanism (EADAM). The latter has been developed only recently. Based on the evaluation of the field data we show that both EADAM and SOSM are preferable compared to the first-come-first-served mechanism. Our findings also demonstrate that EADAM indeed leads to higher eficiency for the students when preferences of course organizers exist. Finally, we survey recent developments on algorithms for multiunit and combinatorial assignment problems, where students have an interest in seats in multiple courses.
| Attribute | Value |
|---|---|
| Title (de) | Stable Matching Mechanismen - Ein Feldexperiment für das Kurszuordnungsproblem |
| Title (en) | Stable Matching Mechanisms - A Field Experiment on Course Allocation Problems |
| Project | |
| Type | Guided Research |
| Status | completed |
| Student | Franz Diebold |
| Advisor | Dr. Alexander W. Schneider |
| Supervisor | Prof. Dr. Martin Bichler Enter a Team Member |
| Start Date | 01.05.2012 |
| Sebis Contributor Agreement signed on | |
| Checklist filled | No |
| Submission date | 01.10.2012 |
| Copyright agreement required | Yes |