Skip to content
Menu
Technical University of Munich
Technical University of Munich

Patrick Lederer

E-Mail: ledererp@in.tum.de 
Phone: +49 (0) 89 289 - 17538
Fax: +49 (0) 89 289 - 17535
Office: Room 01.10.036
Boltzmannstr. 3
85748 Munich, Germany
Hours: by arrangement

Short Bio

I am a PhD student in the group of Prof. Brandt since February 2020. Before that, I studied Informatics at TUM, where I received my Bachelor's degree in 2018 and my Master's degree in 2020. My research focuses on decision making in groups, in particular on how to avoid manipulability in elections. 

Working Papers

T. Delemazure, T. Demeulemeester, M. Eberl, J. Israel, and P. Lederer. Strategy-Proofness and Proportionality in Party-Approval Multi-Winner Elections. 2022. Working Paper. [pdf]

Journal Papers

F. Brandt and P. Lederer. Characterizing the top cycle via strategyproofness. Theoretical Economics, 2022. Forthcoming. [ pdf ]

F. Brandt, M. Bullinger, and P. Lederer. On the indecisiveness of Kelly-strategyproof social choice functions. Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research, 73:1093–1130, 2022. [ link | pdf ]

Conference Papers

F. Brandt, P. Lederer, and W. Suksompong. Incentives in social decision schemes with pairwise comparison preferences. In Proceedings of the 31th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI), pages 130–136, 2022. [ pdf | venue ]

F. Brandt, P. Lederer, and S. Tausch. Strategyproof social decision schemes on super Condorcet domains. In Proceedings of the 4th AAMAS Workshop on Games, Agents, and Incentives, 2022. [ pdf | venue ]

F. Brandt, P. Lederer, and R. Romen. Relaxed notions of Condorcet-consistency and efficiency for strategyproof social decision schemes. In Proceedings of the 21st International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS), 2022. [ link | pdf | venue ]

P. Lederer. Strategyproof randomized social choice for restricted sets of utility functions. In Proceedings of the 30th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI), pages 306–312, 2021. [ link | pdf | venue ]

P. Lederer. Non-manipulability in set-valued and probabilistic social choice theory (doctoral consortium). In Proceedings of the 20th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS), pages 1823–1825, 2021. [ link | pdf | venue ]

F. Brandt, M. Bullinger, and P. Lederer. On the indecisiveness of Kelly-strategyproof social choice functions. In Proceedings of the 20th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS), pages 251–259, 2021. [ link | pdf | venue ]

Teaching

Courses

  • Computational Social Choice (WS 2021/2022)
  • Seminar on Markets, Algorithms, Incentives, and Networks (WS 2020/21)
  • Economics and Computation (SS 2020, SS 2021, SS 2022)

Student Projects

  • Bachelor's thesis  Modeling Utility Functions in Social Choice Theory (Michelle Heinz, 2022)
  • Bachelor's thesis  Random Assignment with Pairwise Comparison Preferences (Patryk Morawski, 2022)
  • Master's thesis  Understanding the SD impossibiliy theorem (Alexander Thole, 2021)
  • Master's thesis  Characterizing the Condorcet Rule (Sascha Tausch, 2021)
  • Master's thesis  Non-manipulable Social Desicision Schemes (Rene Romen, 2020)

Contact me if you are interested in a bachelor thesis/ master thesis in computational social choice!

Community Service

Refereeing Conferences and Workshops

Refereeing Journals

  • Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research (JAIR)
  • Theoretical Economics (TE) [as subreviewer]
  • Games and Economic Behavior (GEB)
  • Social Choice and Welfare (SCW)
To top