
Mete Şeref Ahunbay
mete.ahunbay@in.tum.de | |
Phone | +49 (0) 89 289 17502 |
Fax | +49 (0) 89 289 17535 |
Office | Boltzmannstraße 3 |
Office Hours | By prior arrangement only. |
About
[This part is under construction.]
Publications
Conference Papers
- Two-Buyer Sequential Multiunit Auctions with No Overbidding [arXiv] [Springer]
Mete Şeref Ahunbay, Brendan Lucier, Adrian Vetta
In Proceedings of the 13th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT'20). - The Price of Anarchy of Two-Buyer Sequential Multiunit Auctions [arXiv] [Springer]
Mete Şeref Ahunbay, Adrian Vetta
In Proceedings of the 16th Conference on Web and Internet Economics (WINE'20). - The Price of Stability of Envy-Free Equilibria in Multi-Buyer Sequential Auctions [Springer]
Mete Şeref Ahunbay, Brendan Lucier, Adrian Vetta
In Proceedings of the 14th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT'21). - Improved Two Sample Revenue Guarantees via Mixed-Integer Linear Programming [MATLAB/Mathematica Code] [arXiv] [Springer]
Mete Şeref Ahunbay, Adrian Vetta
In Proceedings of the 14th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT'21).