F. Brandt, C. Dong, and D. Peters. Condorcet-consistent choice among three candidates. 2024. Working paper. [ pdf ] F. Brandt, J. Hofbauer, and M. Strobel. Exploring the no-show paradox for Condorcet extensions. In M. Diss and V. Merlin, editors, Evaluating Voting Systems with Probability Models: Essays by and in Honor of William Gehrlein and Dominique Lepelley, Studies in Choice and Welfare, pages 251–273. Springer-Verlag, 2021. [ link | pdf ] F. Brandl, F. Brandt, C. Geist, and J. Hofbauer. Strategic abstention based on preference extensions: Positive results and computer-generated impossibilities. Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research, 66:1031–1056, 2019. [ link | pdf ] F. Brandl, F. Brandt, and J. Hofbauer. Welfare maximization entices participation. Games and Economic Behavior, 14:308–314, 2019. [ link | pdf ] F. Brandl, F. Brandt, and J. Hofbauer. Random assignment with optional participation. In Proceedings of the 16th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS), pages 326–334, 2017. [ link | pdf | venue ] F. Brandt, C. Geist, and D. Peters. Optimal bounds for the no-show paradox via SAT solving. Mathematical Social Sciences, 90:18–27, 2017. Special Issue in Honor of Hervé Moulin. [ link | pdf ] F. Brandl, F. Brandt, and J. Hofbauer. Incentives for participation and abstention in probabilistic social choice. In Proceedings of the 14th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS), pages 1411–1419, 2015. [ link | pdf | venue ]
